FROM TRADITION TO RELIGION: ORGANISATIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LONDON TURKISH MIGRANT COMMUNITY

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Abstract:
This article aims to explore the transformation of traditional structure into religious organisations as a result of migration in the case of the London Turkish migrant community. The London Turkish migrant community is one of the many Turkish migrant communities in European cities. In fact, it represents a ‘gemeinschaft’ community in terms of traditional belief system and social organisations in a ‘gesellschaft’ society. The London Turkish migrant community has transported its traditional local heritage to a different structure that has represented a different meaning system. As a result of disharmony between the local meaning system and the new structure in Britain, traditional social organisations such as solidarity networks have lost their functions. These functional changes have created their functional equivalent in the structure of the ‘gesellschaft’ community. Consequently, the functional equivalent of traditional solidarity networks, that is, ideological organisations established as a religious centres have replaced traditional solidarity networks and have reorganised the membership system of the community. This structural organisation in the social life of the London Turkish migrant community has taken place according to migration type, settlement pattern and ideological diversities. Also this transformation has differentiated with regard to different subgroups of the London Turkish migrant community such as Anatolian Sunnis, Alevis and Turkish Cypriots.

Key words: Turkish migrants, Structural Transformation, Solidarity Networks, Religious Organisations, Rituals.

Introduction
Migration is a phenomenon that produces new social organisations by transforming the traditional structural features of migrant communities in order to create a community life in new life spaces. For, as Turner indicated (1974: 231-233), migration creates a ‘liminal process’ for migrants: they are neither from their home country nor from the new country. So, as a result of disharmony between their local traditional meaning system as well as the structure constructed depending on their local tradition and the structural organisations of the majority of society, migrant communities have

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transformed their structural organisations and recreated their structural homologies.

Turkish migration to Europe led to the establishment of Turkish migrant communities in many European countries. They aimed to organise their community life according to their own local tradition as well as to integrate their social structure into the social organisational pattern of European countries. However, their life, habits, traditions, appearance, clothes, rituals etc., in other words daily life and community type, were completely different and those migrant communities constructed a different social and cultural category in the social life of European countries. Thus, migration brought about new types of communities and created two types of migrant organisations in European cities: one of them was based on tradition in the inner group structure and the other one was structural integration with the majority community in the public domain. Turkish migrants have reorganised their community life in order not to remain ‘garip’ (lonely) and this kind of traditional perception helped migrants to establish their social organisations on the basis of solidarity networks.

However, the contextualisation of the social organisation of Turkish migrant communities was a complex process depending on many social and cultural factors such as the migration type, settlement pattern, traditional and ideological solidarity networks, as well as the migrant policies of majority communities. The migration to Britain was one of the Turkish migration waves starting in the 1960s to European countries and by the end of this migration process a huge Turkish migrant community had settled in Britain, particularly in London. Moreover, it represents a different social organisation depending on migration type, settlement pattern and solidarity networks.

By evaluating the ideological, ethnic, religious and political diversity in the community, Tayfun Atay has indirectly pointed out that the social organisation type of the London Turkish migrant community is based on ideological and religious fragmentation. While Atay (2010) depicted the structural and ideological features of the Turkish migrant community, he showed that Turkish migrants, who were evaluated under the single and homogenous category of Muslim, in fact had different structural organisations and cultural systems, and sometimes this inner division gave rise to conflicts even in the same subgroup of the community. Atay (1999) also evaluated the Sufi organisation and discussed the differences between Naqshbandi and Wahhabis. He pointed out the transnational character of the Naqshbandi order in London despite its Turkish origin. He (1994) also analysed the Naqshbandi movement in the case of Sheikh Nazim of Cyprus, in his PhD thesis, as a religious group in London. Ian Draper (2004), in his article titled “From Celts to Kaaba Sufism in Glastonbury”, dealt with the
structural transformation of Sufi movements and pointed out the integration of these movements into the cultural belief system of Britain. Talip Küçükcan (2004) also analysed the diasporic organisation and religious identity formulation of Turkish migrants in Britain. In addition, he (1998) discussed the relationship among religious organisation, identity and Islamic education in the case of one religious group in London. Moreover, the religious organisation of Turkish migrants in London was analysed by Küçükcan (1996) in his PhD thesis. In addition to Sunni based religious organisations Ron Geaves (2003) analysed the community formation of British Alevis.

All these studies, which show that the London Turkish migrant community has organised on the basis of religious and ideological structures, prompt the question “How did the original, traditional, organisational pattern in the home country change and transform into a formal and structured religious organisation following migration? In other words, if we conceptualise using Tönnies’s concepts, how was the Turkish migrant community, representing a ‘gemeinschaft’ type of social organisation transform into a ‘gesellschaft’ type social organisation? Therefore, in this study, I aim to explore the social and structural organisation of the London Turkish migrant community on the basis of the relation among migration type, settlement pattern, solidarity networks and ideological organisations.

In this way, I aim to show that the traditional ‘gemeinschaft’ social organisation and solidarity networks before migration changed and were transformed into a ‘gesellschaft’ type social organisation after migration depending on migration type, settlement pattern, and ideological diversity. Since the Turkish migrant community has largely fragmented in terms of ethnicity and religious tendency, three subgroups of the London Turkish migrant community were taken as a sample: Anatolian Sunni migrants (Turkish and Kurdish), Anatolian Alevis (mainly Kurdish), and Turkish Cypriots. I employed participant observation and in depth interviews to gather data during the fieldwork carried out from May 2011-December 2011 in London. Nicknames have been used in this text instead of name of those whom I interviewed. In the light of the data, I will examine whether migration type has any influence on settlement pattern; whether settlement in the same area transformed into the traditional solidarity networks; whether any functional loss occurred in the traditional solidarity networks; and whether the functional equivalent of them was replaced by ideological organisations.

1. Turkish Migration to London and Settlement Pattern

Each subgroup of the London Turkish migrant community has a different migration story and each of them represents a different migration experience. In addition to migration, which started as a demographic
movement from Anatolia for the purpose of education and labour and became a migration by marriage with British women or by asylum seeking, postcolonial and political migration were the main migration types among the London Turkish migrant community. Whereas Turkish Cypriots, for example, represent a postcolonial migration, migrants originating from Anatolia, who were fragmented into two subgroups on the basis of ethnic and religious identities as Turkish and Kurdish or Sunni and Alevi, consisted of refugees or migrants who came to Britain for the purpose of education or work and settled down there following their marriage to British women.

However, none of these migration types were the result of labour migration based on the guest worker policies seen in the case of other European countries. Turkish labour migration to Europe was the result of a collective movement from the same villages or towns in Turkey. It produced traditional solidarity networks, a social space and social relationship in European cities as a result of migrants leading a collective social life in the same boarding houses and working together in the same factories over a long period of time. The collective character of this type of migration transported and reconstructed traditional solidarity and interaction networks among migrant families in European cities. A comparative research, for example, about the Amersfoort (Netherlands) Turkish migrant community showed that Turkish migrants migrated together from the same villages, settled down in same areas, and lived for approximately twenty years in the same lodgings and worked in the same factories. Thus, in addition to integration into the Dutch public social organisational system, they also reconstructed a social space in the inner group enabling them to continue their strong interaction and solidarity networks, tradition, and traditional practices which made them ‘social relatives’ (Sahin, 2009).

In this respect, Britain represents a different context and different experience from other European countries as regards Turkish migration starting in the 1960s in terms of migration type. Turkish migration to Britain was not a result of guest worker policies nor was it a collective movement which started from the same villages or towns and maintained a collective character by living and working in the same places in order to establish traditional and collective solidarity networks. Unlike other European countries, which experienced Turkish migration as a result of guest worker policies, three different migration flows to London took place from the beginning of 1950s; the first of these was the postcolonial migration of Turkish Cypriots. Since Cyprus was a British colony, Turkish Cypriots began to migrate to Britain before the 1950s by using their colonial background.

Ahmet K., who migrated to Britain in 1970, said that the vast majority of Turkish Cypriots arrived in Britain at the beginning of the 1960s and their
migration continued after the 1970s and 1980s. He said that Turkish Cypriots migrated to Britain, particularly to London, because of their colonial background and conflicts with Greek Cypriots and the economical difficulties resulting from the conflict. Although the first Turkish Cypriots did not have high educational levels, most of them were literate. Hülya Ü., who came to London with her family in 1975, said before they came to London her father had gone to London and had bought a big house for them to live in together and they have maintained their networks. The great majority of first generation Turkish Cypriots worked in the textile sector when they first came to Britain.

Turkish Cypriots settled down in the same areas, such as Haringey, Islington, Edmonton, and Enfield, after migrating. Cem T. said that like his family and relatives, Turkish Cypriots preferred to live in the same areas in London after migrating in order to continue kinship and village relationship and networks. However, the first settlement pattern of Turkish Cypriots in London began to gradually change in the 1980s and they began to move to different places in London where the living standard was better; as a result the Turkish Cypriot community scattered in London.

Unlike Turkish Cypriots, Anatolian Sunnis and Alevis showed a much more collectivistic character in terms of migration type and settlement pattern. Even if it was not essentially collectivistic the first migration wave, with mainly two type i.e. educational and labour migration, from Anatolia ended up settling down in the same areas. As Mustafa D. pointed out, Turkish men with educational goals, such as improving their language or participating in higher education, came to Britain at the beginning of the 1970s. In terms of personal profile, the first wave of Anatolian migrants was more educated and from urban areas in comparison to Turkish migrants in other European countries. In addition to this educated category, there was another category consisting of workers; however, both Anatolian migrant categories settled down in Britain by marrying British women or seeking asylum.

As Hasan Y. pointed out, at the beginning of the 1970s, owing to the need for labour in the textile industry and food sector, labour migration started from Turkey to Britain as a second wave from Anatolia. Hasan said that the textile and food sectors were areas in which Turkish Cypriots no longer wished to work as they were difficult sectors and they had improved their social status and income. So, since the Turkish Cypriots had improved their social and economical status, the need for labour occurred in these sectors and this demand for labour led to a new migration wave from rural Anatolia. Thus, the first migrants from Anatolia comprised two categories: the first comprised people from urban areas and educated men; the second consisted of uneducated people and those from rural areas. Both groups
settled down in areas which Turkish Cypriots had left, such as Haringey, Enfield, Edmonton, and Islington. The Anatolian migrants who came as workers to Britain began to work in the food sector in addition to the textile sector.

Except for a small number of cases, such as those who came from Kayseri, Konya and Aksaray, both groups of migrants generally came from different places in Turkey; in other words they were not collective and homogenous in terms of local origin. As a result, although they were not from the same areas in Turkey, they settled down in the same neighbourhoods in London and they began to work in the same business areas.

As in the case of Kenan S., men who came as workers to London brought their wife and children from the beginning of the 1980s, so the migration which started as a male movement transformed into a female movement at the beginning of the 1980s. While the first migration movement was in the process of moving to the next stage, that is, family unification, the third migration wave began from Turkey to Britain at this time. The third wave of Turkish migration to Britain started after the 1980 military coup and as Gulizar T. explained, in parallel to family unification, asylum seekers who were from the leftist socialist movements in Turkey began to migrate to Britain. These migrants who came from Turkey were generally educated-middle class men and women. Following that migration process, Anatolian Alevi, like Servet T. and Ali K., who were mainly Kurdish and were Turkish citizens, began to migrate to Britain at the beginning of the 1990s as asylum seekers, just as the socialist groups had done in the 1980s. Therefore, after the 1980s we see political migration and at the end of this process a large population of Anatolian refugees appeared in London. Servet and Ali said that the Anatolian Alevi who sought and obtained political asylum in Britain settled down in Hackney, Haringey, and Edmonton just like the other Anatolian migrants. This migration wave brought migrants who were uneducated and from rural areas.

Like the first migrant waves from Anatolia who came to Britain for education or work and stayed there after marriage to British women, refugees from socialist groups were not from the same areas in Turkey. However, Anatolian Alevi refugees were from the same areas in Turkey. They were from the area called Binboga Mountain in the eastern part of Anatolia, particularly from Maraş (Elbistan), Sivas (Gürün) and Kayseri (Sarız).

Today, at the end of the migration process, except for Turkish Cypriots, Anatolian migrants live in North London in areas such as Haringey, Hackney, Islington and Enfield. Furthermore, those migrants who began to live in the same places worked in the same business areas,
particularly in the food sector. Although we do not have exact figures relating to the population of the Turkish community, it is estimated to be about 150,000.\(^1\) However, by looking at this demographic density can we say that demographic existence has been transformed into an organised community which has inner group solidarity? In order to answer this question, we need to review their solidarity, communication and interaction networks since membership and social boundaries have traditionally been determined in the context of these networks.

2. Traditional Solidarity Networks: Where are you from “hemşehrim”?

The aforementioned migration types and settlement patterns of the subgroups of the London Turkish migrant community has influenced their solidarity networks and community organisations as well. It seems that in the case of the Turkish Cypriots, postcolonial migration and socialisation within British culture during the colonial period gave rise to an individualistic type of social life, fragmented settlement pattern and weakened traditional interaction and solidarity networks. In the case of Anatolian migrants, although their migration type, which involved political or individual migration for education and work, caused migrants to settle down in the same areas, their different ideological, ethnic and local origins gave rise to weakened traditional solidarity networks and reshaped new solidarity networks and social organisations. Therefore, ideological fragmentation, which was also a strong determinant in the migration process particularly in political migration, was also reflected in the social organisation of the London Turkish migrant community.

Although none of the three subgroups have any solidarity networks of their own and do not have any communication or interaction with each other, the main general connector for the London Turkish migrant community is Turkish. Even if it does not, in itself, establish any solidarity networks, language creates a framework for communication and interaction between the three subgroups. Speaking Turkish may differ according to groups and generations. As far as I could observe, Anatolian Sunnis speak Turkish and establish their communication and interaction networks on the basis of Turkish. Like the first generation of Anatolian Sunnis, except for some members of the second and third generations, who went to school in London, first and second generation Anatolian Alevis do not know English. In the public domain, Anatolian Alevis, even if they are Kurdish, speak Turkish when communicating with each other and they establish their solidarity networks on the basis of Turkish. In the private domain, the older generation, especially women, may speak Kurdish but other generations do not know

Kurdish, and even if they do, they prefer to speak Turkish to communicate with each other. However, unlike Anatolian migrants, except for the first and partially the second generation, most Turkish Cypriots only speak English so that some of them do not speak Turkish, or some speak Turkish with a very strong English accent making them difficult to understand.

In the case of Turkish Cypriots it is almost impossible to say that their settlement pattern has been transformed into solidarity networks or that it created a basis for these networks, since they have very individual life styles. As Hulya U., Ahmet K., Mehmet T., and Inci H. stated, the settlement pattern of Turkish Cypriots in London began to change from the 1980s onwards and the Turkish Cypriot community scattered in London. After this settlement process we cannot now talk about a single place or area in London that can be identified as mostly Turkish Cypriots. As a result, the original local connection and relationships have weakened and have not transformed into any traditional solidarity networks. While Ahmet B., who came to London with his family when he was two years old, was sharing his migration experience with me, he pointed out the transformation of social relationships and interactions. In his opinion, the sense of solidarity, the close relationships, and original culture and social structure largely lost importance and the individual British life style replaced this traditional cultural organisation after migration; thus, second and third generations of Turkish Cypriots began to follow a fairly individualistic life style. Despite their high numbers and economic opportunities, their scattered settlement pattern, loose solidarity networks resulted in Turkish Cypriots becoming the most invisible part of the Turkish migrant community in London.

On the other hand, when we asked about the factors which are necessary to construct a solidarity network, most Anatolian Sunnis and Alevis suggested local origin and kinship. Almost all of the migrants whom I interviewed, asked me immediately, “Where are you from ‘hemsehir’?”. I observed that whenever they met someone from Turkey they asked about the person’s hometown and called each other ‘hemsehir’ (my fellow-townsmen) in order to indicate that they shared the same traditional bonds. For them, local origin indicates the ethnic origin, religious or ideological background of a person as well as showing whether the person knows the traditional rules and meaning systems on which communication and interaction networks are based.

Moreover, according to them, in order to become a member of a traditional solidarity network, everyone must know and trust each other since these networks are based on reciprocal interactions and exchanges as well as requiring some traditional rules during communication. For them, when they were living in Turkey they shared the same tradition and rules as their neighbours and could easily become a member of a solidarity network and
therefore fulfil their responsibilities in accordance with tradition. Furthermore, according to them solidarity networks, which accompanied every social, economic, biological transformation from birth to death in social and cultural life and are based on a reciprocal relation between community members, remind a person of who he/she is. Remaining apart from these networks is seen by community members as a kind of ‘gariplik’ (loneliness) and in order not to be ‘gariip’ it is seen as essential to become a member of these solidarity networks. It seems that Anatolian migrants organise their social life on the basis of solidarity networks in order to be a member of the community in accordance with their hometown where social life was mainly collective and based on solidarity networks.

In this framework, traditional solidarity networks have been continued by families in the form of traditional practice and rituals in addition to interactions and communications in order not to be ‘gariip’ in social life. However, we saw only loose and limited traditional solidarity networks focusing on families and relatives in daily life because of diversity in local origin as well as religious and ideological diversity. Among Anatolian Sunnis and Alevis in addition to communication and interaction, which is called ‘ziyaret-oturma’ (visiting-sitting) and is organised between families on periodic basis, solidarity networks are generally related to important events in daily life such as marriage, birth, death, circumcision, illnesses, accidents, buying a house…etc. Visiting each other, for example, is a kind of periodical communication network providing families with news of each other in order to organise traditional solidarity networks for biological, social, traditional, economic transformations such as birth, marriage, death, illness, buying something new, travel…etc.

Community members visit each other in their homes as a consequence of these solidarity networks to mark events which have social and traditional dimensions. In the case of a death, for example, although it is uncommon among Turkish Cypriots, members of solidarity networks among Anatolian Sunnis and Alevis participate in funeral rites and visit the family of the dead person as a reciprocal, traditionally obligatory requirement of solidarity networks, and they bring some food with them. For the most important feature of these solidarity networks is their reciprocal character; each member of these solidarity networks has to perform all the economic and traditional requirements of these networks. The most concrete example of this can be seen among Anatolian Alevis in the case of the rite of ‘kirk yemegi’; this is a traditional meal eaten by all community members on the fortieth day of a person’s death in order to indicate that the dead person has passed to the next world and that the family has restarted its normal social life after a forty-day period of mourning. In spite of any conflicts between them, Anatolian migrants come together in the Cemevi (religious centre) for the ‘kirk yemegi’ in order to fulfil their duties according to the solidarity networks.
networks since death is seen as a kind of basic social and structural transformation in human life and participation in this rite is regarded as a kind of obligation. I observed that the counterpart of this solidarity network among Anatolian Sunnis was ‘mevlit’ and it fulfilled the same functions as ‘kirk yemegi’ in the Alevi community. ‘Mevlit’ also has the same importance in the Turkish Cypriot community in spite of their secular and individualistic lives.

We can also see the reciprocal character of solidarity networks in the case of marriage ceremonies. Although traditional marriage ceremonies have almost evaporated among Turkish Cypriots, Anatolian Alevis and Sunnis insist on the continuity of solidarity networks relating to marriage. Families are expected to support each other by giving a certain amount of money and participating in each phase of the organisation of the marriage ceremony; they are also expected to come to the marriage ceremony owing to the reciprocal character of traditional solidarity networks. The main actors in organising these solidarity networks are female and the main form of these traditional solidarity networks are rituals. Sibel G. pointed out the important roles of women in the formation of solidarity networks on the basis of reciprocity as follows:

Before getting married, I had not been a member of any solidarity networks, but now I am a mother, and I have three children. My children will grow up; we will live many events together such as marriage, circumcision, birth of their children…etc. We will live sad or happy events, so I have to participate in rituals and I have to organise these solidarity networks; moreover, I have to help women who organise them. Our tradition is so, and we saw from our grandmothers and grandfathers, and we have to come together for our neighbours so that they can come together for our children and for us.

As Sibel said, they see participation in these networks, which are in the form of rituals, as necessary since they themselves will organise these kinds of rituals when their own children grow up. In addition to Sibel’s comment, as we understood from interviews with Gulizar and Servet, if migrants want passages in their life to be ritualised and to be acknowledged by the whole community, they become members of solidarity networks. These solidarity networks, whose main actors are women, are usually organised on the basis of local origin, allowing that the circle has been enlarged depending on religious tendency such as being Sunni or Alevi, and ethnicity. We observed this fact in the case of economic solidarity networks which have been established on the basis of local origin and being from Turkey; in North London, one can see that many shops are called ‘Elbistan’. When we keep in mind that ‘Elbistan’ is a town in Turkey, we can easily understand that migrants are aiming to establish economic and social solidarity on the basis of local origin. We can also see the name of certain places, people, or
families from Turkey such as Istanbul, Anadolu, Erciyes, Goksu, Erbil, Ulus, Umut, Sesen, Bogazici…etc. in North London. These kinds of names also invite migrants to construct economic and traditional solidarity networks on the basis of local origin and identity.

Although the aforementioned examples have created solidarity networks among migrants, these networks, which might have a ritual form or might be constructed because of rituals, have only bonded community members loosely and have not spread to the whole community; in addition their effects have remained limited to those with the same local origin. As far as I could observe Anatolian migrants maintain traditional solidarity networks on the basis of local origin. Even if Anatolian migrants have only limited or minimal traditional solidarity networks restricted to local origin, almost no traditional solidarity networks have been transported and recreated among Turkish Cypriots except for very limited communication networks within their own particular groups. So, compared to the hometowns of migrants, these networks have become smaller and lost some of their roles such as performing some practices as a requirement of these networks; bringing the community together; strengthening social bonds and the collective character of the community; assigning membership; and creating economic and social support. Thus, the inseparable practices of solidarity networks which accompany all social and structural transformations such as visiting each other, economic exchange and coming together for organisational purposes have weakened among Anatolian migrants. I observed that most solidarity networks relating to the basic traditional events and rituals became just a case of meeting together and participation in social events by losing their cultural meanings and functions.

It seems that migration type, fragmented settlement pattern, and different local origins discourage migrants from collective cooperation and reduce the effects of solidarity networks. Even if most Anatolian migrants still stay in North London, owing to their migration type leading to a fragmented social structure, they are unable to construct a united social space in which they can continue their traditional social life within a solidarity network and thus become social relatives. The refugee position, for example, involving a process which requires becoming a British citizen and takes almost ten years, has created a very individual, unreliable, suspicious community life among Anatolian migrants with no community membership or bonds. Refugees lead very individualistic lives until they get British citizenship, and do not participate in any social or cultural practices including solidarity networks since they might go back to Turkey. Economic difficulties have also reduced the effect of solidarity networks which require mutual interaction and exchange.
In addition to these factors, the most important factor weakening solidarity networks and making them smaller is ideological diversity among Anatolian migrants. Thus, in the case of Anatolian migrants, their migration type brought migrants together in the same physical space; however, owing to ideological diversity which can also be seen in their migration type, their settlement pattern did not transform into traditional strong solidarity networks which could create a social space and community structure. Furthermore, as we can see in the case of Anatolian Alevis who came from the same areas in Turkey, the collective character of migration could not be transformed into a solidarity network and it remained insufficient to draw a community border because of different ideological, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. Furthermore, because of ideological diversity, we did not observe any general solidarity networks on the basis of Alevi identity. Therefore, ideological diversities have brought about weakened solidarity networks and functional disappearance.

This functional disappearance of traditional solidarity networks stemming from ideological diversities shows that these networks have weakened on the one hand and it has also shifted the direction of solidarity among migrants from a traditional organisational pattern in the flow of daily life to institutional organisations. Therefore, it created a new organisational structure and a new form of solidarity network has replaced the old, namely ideological organisations such as religious and cultural centres. So, actually, religious and cultural organisations represent a kind of structural transformation and integration into the social structure of Britain, and they are the functional equivalent of traditional solidarity networks whose functions have been weakened or lost due to migration type, settlement pattern, ideological and religious diversity.

When Geertz researched transformation and change depending on migration from rural areas to urban areas in Java, he found that when disharmony arose between the social structure and belief system or ideology during a period of rapid change, some rituals and traditional practices failed to fulfil their functions. In his opinion, this loss of function in traditional practices indicated some transformation in the social structure and organisation as well as a transformation from local sameness to ideological like-mindedness (Geertz, 1973: 143-164; 1957:36, 49). On the other hand, Turner pointed out that in the case of pilgrimage new functional equivalents may replace some traditional practices (Turner, 1974: 65). As Geertz and Turner pointed out in the case of transformation of cultural practice, when there is disharmony between social structure and a traditional belief system or ideological component, some transformation may take place depending on the loss of functions and functional equivalents may replace it.
Consequently, London Turkish migrants have experienced major, rapid change and transformation due to migration. They have become a ‘gemeinschaft’ community in a ‘gesellschaft’ society as a result of migration since they have transported their traditional heritage to a different structure that has a different meaning system. Therefore, their traditional solidarity networks which were structural components of their local, traditional meaning system could not be integrated into the structure of the ‘gesellschaft’ society. As a result of disharmony between the local traditional meaning system and the new structure, traditional organisations such as solidarity networks failed to operate properly and their functions disappeared. However, these functional disappearances seen in traditional organisations have created their equivalent according to ideological diversity in the context of the structure of this ‘gesellschaft’ society. The functional equivalent of traditional solidarity networks, that is ideological organisations, such as religious and cultural centres, has replaced these traditional solidarity networks in the London Turkish migrant community.

3. Organisational Transformation: Religious or Traditional Solidarity?

While traditional solidarity networks are based on a ‘gemeinschaft’ structure with collectivistic, reciprocal, local, ritualistic features, new forms of solidarity networks are based on a ‘gesellschaft’ structure with individual participation, a legal membership procedure, and ideological frame as well as a transnational character. It seems that the most important function of these ideological organisations is to seek solutions for problems related to conflicts between the local traditional belief system and structural organisation. As Geertz (1957: 49) said in the case of Java, when there is a gap between the structural organisation of new places and the local belief system, conflicts occur. In his opinion, the gap between structural organisation and belief system gives rise to functional disappearance since the rituals, which are the most important part of the cultural meaning system, are unable to be performed because of different social structures. Geertz (1973: 143-164) concluded that the main problem lay in conflicts between being peasant in terms of belief system on the one hand, and being urban in terms of the structural features.

As Geertz indicated, even if London Turkish migrants have a traditional local belief system, they migrated to a society with a ‘gesellschaft’ structure, so their community became a ‘gemeinschaft’ existence in terms of cultural mentality in a ‘gesellschaft’ type society. They used to organise their community structures in their hometowns according to traditional collectivistic features instead of an individualistic and institutional structure. Because of the new structural features in a ‘gesellschaft’ community, they were unable to organise their social life in
accordance with their traditional belief system. They were also unable to perform traditional practices and rituals, such as traditional solidarity networks, and had to integrate their local belief system into the new structural feature of Britain.

Original structural character of community which is based on patriarchy, collectivistic lifestyle, close kinship relation and ritualistic tendency has discouraged migrants from establishing a social structure according to traditional belief system since it is almost opposite to the modern, individualistic and institutional structural organisation of Britain. Furthermore, other ideologies which are different from their traditional belief system, such as Marxist political movements, racist ideologies and orthodox religious movements, have also prevented migrants from taking their traditional folk belief system into consideration when organising community structure.

Migrants who realised that they were unable to construct their structural organisations according to their local traditions, created social organisations which integrated into the British social structure, on the one hand, and enabled them to continue some key components of their traditional belief system and rituals. Therefore, they created the functional equivalent of traditional solidarity networks within ideological organisations in accordance with the structural organisation of Britain based on multicultural policies. Thus, Turkish migrants were able to continue the main key components of their tradition as well as come together for traditional events in these structural organisations which represented structural integration into British society and the continuity of traditional organisations in the form of their functional equivalents. This organisational pattern has changed its membership system, identity references, and community boundaries.

However, these organisations, which represented institutional structural integration into British society, have also weakened the sense of local belonging. Therefore, they have become a melting pot for local and traditional belief systems and rituals in the multicultural environment of London and have also produced general symbolic identities and indefinite social borders which lie beyond local and physical spaces. Thus, while traditional solidarity networks produced traditional identity and membership depending on local origin, these new networks which have been contextualised according to the British social structure have created transnational and symbolic identity and membership. Migrants who come together in these ideological organisations have begun to communicate with similar ideological organisations in different countries. Thus, this structural transformation of the London Turkish migrant community seen in terms of ideological organisations and their functional equivalency to local traditional organisations indicate globalised, transnational and deterritorialised
symbolic communities imagining themselves according to ideologies. These organisations assign migrants membership on the basis of ideology instead of local origin and bring them together in a symbolic space based on this ideology.

Anatolian Sunnis who settled down in the same areas in London have transformed their traditional local solidarity networks into religious organisations. It seems that Anatolian Sunnis have benefited from the traditional symbolic meanings of mosques while they were organising their social structure according to ‘gesellschaft’ community structure of British society. Most of the Sunnis I interviewed indicated that mosques with their minarets symbolise Turkey with all traditional components and being Turkish. Therefore, actual mosques and minarets are seen as important components of the symbolic identity of Anatolian Sunni migrants.

While they were establishing these structural organisations, Anatolian Sunnis collaborated with religious groups representing different ideologies since they could easily adapt themselves to the structure of the majority community and could organise as foundations or associations as they did in Turkey and other European countries before Britain. For, unlike Britain, in Turkey, for example, religious groups which organised as associations and foundations without regard to their original religious hierarchy and organisational form were unknown since social structural organisation on the basis of religion, such as ‘cemaat’ and tariqa, was illegal in mosques. Therefore, they can now adapt and organise themselves according to different structures and have benefited from these experiences in organising themselves in London and in attracting Anatolian Sunni migrants to their centres by transforming traditional solidarity networks according to British social structure.

In fact, solidarity networks established on the basis of religious ideology were unfamiliar in the hometowns of Anatolian Sunnis, since their hometown represented folk religion with different features from orthodox Islam and in these areas solidarity networks were based on local tradition and kinship relation. However, it seems that the traditional symbolic significance of mosques and the organisational capability of religious groups have come together in the case of Sunni religious organisations resulting in the creation of new forms of solidarity networks in these centres. Their legal status and legal rights to carry out certain social and cultural events such as marriages, funerals, circumcision, sacrifice…etc. also make them the centre of new social solidarity networks. Furthermore, their capacity to provide Sunnis with a venue, traditional services and religious professionals in order to perform some basic traditional rituals such as ‘mevlit’ and ‘kirk yemegi’ has strengthened their roles in establishing solidarity networks in their organisations.
Therefore, mosques have gained new roles and functions which were formerly held by traditional networks in Turkey and they have become centres for new solidarity networks. They bring migrants together not only for religious purposes, but also for traditional practices, so the functions of traditional solidarity networks have been transmitted to mosques. Anatolian Sunnis who become members of these religious organisations come together for traditional rituals in these religious organisations and continue their traditional and ritualistic solidarity networks. Thus, these religious organisations have become the functional equivalent of traditional solidarity networks based on new structural organisations. They are a concrete example of how structural transformation and functional equivalency in solidarity network organisations established by Anatolian Sunnis who came from the same areas in Turkey have intensified in the same religious organisations. We observed that some Anatolian Sunnis who shared the same local origin were members of the same religious organisations, such as migrants from Aksaray meeting in mosques run by the Suleymancis. This means that traditional local solidarity networks have been transformed to these religious organisations.

Furthermore, religious organisations have also produced a transnational framework and communities, since they follow the orthodox doctrinal and ritual perspective of Islam instead of local traditional folk belief system and rituals. Migrants become members of the transnational networks of these organisations and obtain symbolic identity by membership of these organisations. Therefore, the religious organisations of Anatolian Sunnis have become part of the transnational symbolic network all over the world. So, while the ideological framework of these religious organisations has created a fragmented social structure, even conflicts, among Anatolian Sunnis, at the same time they have created transnational communities which are part of an ideological network extending all over the world. They have given migrants symbolic identity according to this ideological brotherhood network. On the other hand, in turn, they have also melted the local traditional collective community structure, while these organisational patterns have produced transnational symbolic communities.

The oldest and most well-established religious organisation among Anatolian Sunnis is that of the Suleymancis in London. Since the Suleymancis were the first religious organisation in most European countries after the Turkish migration, they have a well-established communication network with their organisations in other countries. They have five mosques: Suleymaniye, Wood-Green Fatih, Valide Sultan, Greenwich, and Ilford mosque. The Suleymaniye Mosque was their centre and the first mosque with a minaret in London. Their ideological tendency is based on the mystic ideas of Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan and they describe themselves as followers of Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan. Their initial main purpose was to teach Sunni
migrants to read the Quran; for this reason they established ‘Quran Kursu’. A ‘Quran Kursu’ is a place where reading the Quran is taught to children. They also have residential courses for studying the Quran. In addition to teaching the Quran, they also offer the following religious services: daily and weekly prayers, funeral ceremonies, sacrifice, pilgrimage, and carrying out traditional ceremonies such as ‘mevlit’, marriage ceremonies, and circumcision as well as conducting legal services such as marriages. They have thus created a solidarity network among Sunnis. As in former traditional solidarity networks, Suleymancis often perform traditional rituals on behalf of their members such as ‘mevlit’, which is an important and common ritual performed on the fortieth day after a person’s death in order to remember the dead person, although orthodox Islam does not recognise this ritual since it is seen as a kind of heterodox tradition.

From what I understand, members came together and established solidarity networks in the mosques of the Suleymancis owing to the social and cultural services provided by their professionals such as marriage, circumcision, funeral, sacrifice, and ‘mevlit’ which used to be performed by traditional solidarity networks in the past. In order to perform religious and traditional services they have trained their professionals such as imams, vaiz (preachers), and muezzin. In this way, they are able to control religious and traditional cultural domains and extend their influence to other Sunnis since they need religious professionals to perform traditional and religious rituals.

All these kinds of activities are performed by Suleymancis depending on a membership system; thus, as Bourdieu mentioned (1990:123-139), they have transformed into social, economic and symbolic capital, in other words, solidarity networks to social capital and power. They have attempted to enlarge their dominance in London by organising religious and cultural activities in order to reach more migrants as can be seen in the case of Turkish Cypriots. They have assigned an imam to the Turkish Cypriot mosque called Ramazan-i Serif and have invited Turkish Cypriots to their religious and social activities such as festivals. In this way they aim to create new ‘social capital’ and to enlarge the social domain controlled by them. It seems that the Turkish Cypriots, who have a very secular life style, are a potential source by which to create new social and economic capital. Essentially, their attempts to enlarge and protect their social, cultural and economic capital are related to the increasing activities of other religious organisations and groups, particularly the Nur groups as well as the Turkish Religious Foundation which began to operate in London a few years ago.

Furthermore, while they continue solidarity networks by supplying professionals, performing social and cultural events and renting their centres for rituals, in turn, their solidarity networks have been maintained because of competition for social capital and social power. Moreover, their membership
system also created the functional equivalent of traditional solidarity networks. Members of this organisation come together not only for the religious and traditional events mentioned above, but also for private events such as illness, accidents, or any social, cultural or economic transformation such as birth, buying a house, establishing a business, travel…etc.

Another Sunni religious organisation in London is the Aziziye mosque to which the Turkish Religious Foundation has assigned an imam depending on demand. As far as I could see although Aziziye had a connection with a Naqshi tariqa in Turkey, in recent years this tariqa has lost its control of this organisation because of the influence of the Turkish Religious Foundation. In addition to religious practices and religious education, like the Suleymancis, funeral, pilgrimage, sacrifice, and ‘mevlit’ services are performed by this organisation and it has established a solidarity network on the basis of these rituals among their members. Although the Nur group was established as a mosque organisation in Britain, as Suleymancis and Aziziye, in a different way from the original organisational pattern in other countries, it is not interested in religious rituals performed in mosques. Moreover, its solidarity networks established among members are not based on rituals and events performed by mosques.

In contrast to its original organisational pattern in other countries including Turkey, the Nur groups, whose centre is the Mevlana Rumi Mosque and which usually prefers to organise as schools and houses particularly student houses, has structured itself on the basis of a mosque organisation in London. It seems that the Nur group has structured itself as a mosque in order to benefit from traditional solidarity networks, which were carried out in social settings consisting of family units and houses in Turkey. These have been transformed to religious organisations in Britain. They also hope to transform these solidarity networks into social capital and power. This different organisational pattern in the Nur group validates our hypothesis that solidarity networks have been transformed to religious organisations and that religious organisations have become the functional equivalent of these traditional solidarity networks. Therefore, it seems that the Nur group is using the functions of solidarity networks, which have been transformed to religious organisations, in order to operate in London and, like other religious organisations, it aims to enlarge its social and cultural domain using the mosques as a centre.

As indicated above, since their main original structural pattern was based on educational organisation, traditional and cultural events such as ‘mevlit’, circumcision, pilgrimage, marriage, sacrifice…etc. are not performed by the Nur group as much as by other religious organisations. They generally prefer to perform these rituals by means of cooperation with other religious organisations and have concentrated their activities on
education. Their main means to construct solidarity networks among members is religious conversation and reading the Risale-i Nur which is a book by Said-i Nursi and is considered as sacred by the members. Even if they consider their organisation as a centre for dialogue, they do not have any social relations with other religious communities except for Anatolian Sunnis. Although they carry out their activities in their mosque, they have also attempted to adopt their original organisational pattern, so they opened some student houses and attempted to establish a school in London in 2011.

All three religious organisations hold periodic religious conversation meetings in their centres. Members of these organisations maintain their communication and interaction networks which can be transformed into strong solidarity networks in cases of basic social and cultural events such as birth, marriage, death, disease, accident…etc. Moreover, all three religious organisations hold annual events called “kermes” or “festivals” in order to bring their community members together and introduce their services to their members or sympathisers. Furthermore, in addition to attracting new members in these assemblies they collect money by selling some products or food which members provide for these periodical assemblies. Members also communicate, keep in touch with each other and maintain their solidarity networks by means of these meetings. In addition to small associations called ‘kermes’ which are organised by women in all the aforementioned religious organisations; a big annual festival is held by the Suleymancis. Their services are introduced, and some products and food are sold by members. These kinds of associations maintain solidarity networks by promoting a communication and interactions as well as economical reciprocity among members.

Besides these mosques, there are some mescids in London and these mescids are essentially the centres of some ideological groups. Unlike mosques, they aim to establish solidarity networks in these mescids based on ideological communication and interactions instead of traditional ritual events. These mescids, in which daily prayers are performed, strengthen communication and interaction between members by establishing an ideological network. Muradiye is a mescid which has established ideological interaction and communication networks based on nationalist political tendency. National Vision (Milli Gorus) has a centre and mescid where daily prayers can be performed. Milli Gorus is a political and religious movement which is more effective in other European countries although they are very weak in London. Essentially, they are a branch of the Islamic Community Milli Gorus whose centre is in Germany.

While traditional solidarity networks have been transformed to cooperation in religious organisations among Anatolian Sunnis, Turkish Cypriots, who have a Sunni tendency, have been unable to transform their
traditional solidarity networks to cooperation in religious or cultural organisations because of their scattered settlement patterns and postcolonial migration. As we indicated above, scattered settlement pattern and postcolonial migration type of Turkish Cypriots have resulted in weakened collective bonds and they have begun to lead very individual lives. As a result, they have organised cultural centres for leisure activities and limited and superficial communication and interactions with each other instead of establishing solidarity networks. The disappearance of rituals depending on weakening collectivity has brought about a loss of almost all solidarity networks among Turkish Cypriots. Except for death, it seems that almost all ritual components of the social lives of Turkish Cypriots have evaporated as a result of this individualised life style. Depending on this individualisation and deritualisation process their solidarity network has either been restricted to family members or evaporated among Turkish Cypriots. The second and third generations in particular are completely unfamiliar with their traditions and lead very individual lives, not participating in any solidarity networks.

Turkish Cypriots have cultural centres instead of religious organisations, except for the Sheikh Nazim Dergahi and Ramazan-i Serif mosque. The CTCA-Council of Turkish Cypriot Associations is the umbrella organisation of Turkish Cypriots. Some cultural activities such as film days, meditation, sports, and seminars are held in the cultural centres but it is almost impossible to observe any traditional solidarity networks in these centres. In addition to cultural centres, it is also impossible to see any strong solidarity networks have been established in the mosques. The movement of Sheikh Nazim of Cyprus is a mystical movement and followers have their centre, which perform the tariqa rituals, in the Hakkani Dergahi (Atay, 1994; Coştu, 2009).

As far as I am concerned the Sheikh Nazim movement appears to be a movement fundamental to Turkish Cypriots who lead very individualistic and secular lives. The strong religious tendency of the Sheikh Nazim movement has discouraged Turkish Cypriots from joining this organisation. Furthermore, it seems that the heterogeneity of members in terms of ethnicity, local origin, culture…etc. has also discouraged migrants from establishing a solidarity network within this organisation. As a result, as Ahmet B. indicated, although some Turkish migrants who were from Turkey and Cyprus had followed this religious movement for a while, it had been unable to attract Turkish migrants, and in particular Turkish Cypriots long term since it was not based on local origins and traditional networks. Therefore, it had been unable to transform a religious centre which had been a structural homology of the traditional solidarity networks.

Unlike the Sheikh Nazim movement, we could observe a solidarity network, even if it was very loose and restricted to death rituals, in the
Ramazan-i Şerif mosque. Solidarity networks related to funeral rituals can be seen in this organisation which manages the graveyard used by Muslims (Brookwood Cemetery) in London. When we take into consideration that most of Turkish Cypriots are buried in Britain, in addition to other religious services this situation has made this mosque important for solidarity networks based on the death ceremony. Funeral rites, particularly ‘mevlit’, are the most concrete rituals which continue to be performed and establish solidarity networks among Turkish Cypriots. As I have indicated above, an imam assigned by the Suleymancis performs religious rituals including ‘mevlit’ in this mosque. Except for ‘mevlit’ it is almost impossible to observe any traditional solidarity networks among Turkish Cypriots. As Geertz pointed out in the case of structural transformation which can be seen the loss of rituals, the loss of their basic rituals and solidarity networks, and the stress on death phenomena indicate, metaphorically, a gradual decease of the social memory, structure and cultural meaning system of the Turkish Cypriots.

Unlike Turkish Cypriots, Anatolian Alevis have solidarity networks even if they are very loose compared to those in their hometowns. It seems that Anatolian Alevis who came to London as asylum seekers have failed to establish traditional local solidarity networks and, as a result of this functional disappearance, cultural centres have replaced them and they have organised on the basis of religious and cultural centres. Furthermore, the leftist and socialist ideological perspectives, which are dominant among Alevi asylum seekers, have encouraged them to organise their social life on the basis of these ideological tendencies. Approximately all cultural centres in the Alevi community are centres for asylum seekers and most of them follow socialist political tendencies. The most important of these cultural centres are Daymer, Halkevi, and Alevi Cultural Centre and Cemevi. In spite of political, ethnic and even racist stress, Turkish is commonly spoken in these centres and Turkish television channels are permanently switched on just as in Turkish Cypriot cultural centres and Anatolian Turkish mosques.

Only the Alevi Cultural Centre and Cemevi can be defined as a religious organisation among the other cultural centres of Anatolian Alevis. Even if we observe solidarity networks which are established on the basis of rituals and local origin, we can also see that most religious activities are not performed in this centre owing to the lack of any religious authority such as ‘dede’ or ‘baba’. In the case of religious rites such as cem, ‘dedes’ are invited from Germany and Turkey in order to perform these rites. However, Alevis have established solidarity networks because of funeral rites particularly “kirk yemegi”, which is a remembrance meal for the dead on the fortieth day after death, mourning for Kerbela, and Ashura day. Like the other Alevi organisations, the Cemevi organises annual events in order to bring community members together. As a result of these festivals community
members can keep in touch and maintain their interaction, communication and solidarity networks. I observed that community members came together for these cultural events, particularly religious rites such as cem, and they have established interaction and solidarity networks around these social and cultural practices in the Cemevi. Whenever members of the other Cemevis in other cities in Britain come to London in order to participate in the cem rite, members of the Cultural Centre and Cemevi show hospitality to them and invite them to their homes as a requirement of the solidarity networks which have been established in their cultural centre.

It seems that their traditional solidarity networks have withdrawn from daily life to the Cemevi because of the migration type and ideological diversities among Alevis and Alevis who describe themselves with religious identity have intensified in the Cemevi. There are too many different ideological tendencies among Alevis in terms of ethnic, political and religious tendencies to establish a general solidarity network. These ideological diversities prevent Alevis from establishing a large-scale and strong solidarity network even if they are from the same local area. As indicated, their refugee position is another factor discouraging them from establishing a general solidarity network based on similarity of local origin. Instead of general networks, Alevis have focused on establishing different cultural centres according to their ideological tendencies, so traditional solidarity networks have been transformed to these ideological organisations and such networks have been established in these centres.

Like Sunni organisations, the Cemevi has also tried to transform these solidarity networks into social capital and political power. The Cemevi, for example, asked their members to declare their ethnic origin as Kurdish and their religious background as Alevi in the 2011 census in order to get a political power depending on its members’ ethnic and religious background. Similarly, the Cemevi has ensured the teaching of Alevism in British schools and Alevism has been taught a few schools as a religion; in this way they have been able to transform the solidarity networks among their members to a political control and legal right. However, this kind of attempt to create and control social and political capital might give rise to conflicts between different ideological groups as we observed in the case of the Cemevi. The Cemevi has recently witnessed political and legal conflicts between two ideological and local groups which tried to control the Alevi community on the basis of political, religious and ethnic tendencies. These two groups in conflict with each other were the main local groups among the Alevi community; one of them was from Maraş and the other was from Sivas. These two main groups tried to establish solidarity networks in the Cemevi on the basis of local origin as in traditional solidarity networks and to transform this solidarity networks to social capital and political power.
On the other hand, these conflicts also showed us the transformed character of the traditional solidarity networks shaped on the basis of local origin. Their migration type as asylum seekers has discouraged Alevis from constructing a general Alevi community and identity and ideological diversities have also strengthened this fragmentation. So, since membership and community border as well as solidarity networks are determined by a traditional local ‘Ocak’ system, which is the sacred lineage based on Ehl-i Beyt, and by religious leaders called ‘dede’ who is attached to Ocak, in Anatolia, their identities have become merely a symbolic identity. Because of the lack of a ‘dede’ and the disappearance of some basic rites which assign membership to Alevis, being Alevi has become just a symbolic identity. Although ‘musahiplik’, for example, which was a solidarity network that was constructed by the ‘dede’ in the context of the cem rituals among the Alevis belonging to the same local Ocak, has disappeared among Alevis because of migration type and ideological diversities it has been transformed to membership of the Cemevi. Therefore, like Sunni organisations despite the emphasis on local origin, the Cemevi has created a symbolic identity because of migration type and the ideological diversities among them. As a result of this symbolic identity, even if they are from the same areas in Turkey, their migration type and ideological references have shaped a transnational community; for the Cemevi has communication and interaction networks with other Alevi Cemevis in Britain as well as in Europe.

Consequently, as we saw in the case of Turkish Cypriots, Anatolian Alevis and Sunnis, traditional solidarity networks based on local origin have been transformed into religious and cultural organisations in London. Therefore, local origin, that is being from Turkey or being from the same areas, is an important factor in order to become a member of a solidarity network within religious or cultural organisations. We observed this fact in the case of communication and interactions between the same religious tendencies or ethnic groups. Although both of them are Sunnis, i.e. Anatolian Sunnis and Turkish Cypriots, for example, they do not go to each others’ mosques and they do not have any interaction or solidarity networks. This situation justified our hypothesis that traditional local solidarity networks have been transformed to religious and cultural organisations. Similarly, neither Anatolian Sunnis nor Turkish Cypriots go to the mosques of other Muslim communities from the other Muslim countries.

This means that Sunnis do not identify themselves on the basis of formal Islam; instead, local origin, and a traditional local belief system and in particular traditional rituals, which are the determinant of the solidarity networks, are more important in identifying themselves and establishing solidarity networks. Different religious tendencies are also influential in the construction of solidarity networks. Although Turkish Cypriots, for example,
see themselves in the Sunni domain, they are not particularly religious; instead, they identify themselves as secular. Furthermore, religious tendencies may give rise to some conflicts between Turkish Cypriots and Anatolian Sunni subgroups and discourage them from establishing any solidarity networks.

Turkish Cypriots, such as Mehmet S. for example, emphasised their secular character and criticised Anatolian migrants, they described migrants who came from Turkey as ‘black bearded’ meaning that Turkish migrants who came from Turkey were more religious than them and it was impossible to communicate with them. Anatolian Alevis describe themselves as a religion separate from Sunni Islam and they do not share any solidarity networks with other Muslim communities, although they are generally seen as a denomination of Islam. It seems that local tradition and ideological diversity between communities make it impossible to construct a general religious identity and solidarity network regarding being a Muslim in spite of local origins. Furthermore, it was observed that ethnic background was not the basis of solidarity networks among Alevis except for some racist movements. Moreover, even if they had the same ethnic origin, for example, Kurds who were from Turkey did not have any communication or solidarity networks with Kurds who were from Iraq or other countries in London.

Therefore, in fact, firstly, being from Turkey in London is an umbrella concept comprising local traditions and local traditional solidarity networks which have been transformed into religious and cultural organisations. The structural character of the Turkish migrant community on the basis of religious and cultural organisation has constructed a space which allows them to communicate and keep in touch. This space is based on the cultural, religious and ideological framework of communities as well as on the structural organisation of British society.

Consequently Turkish migration created a ‘gemeinschaft’ community in a ‘gesellschaft’ society and led to a gap between the local tradition of their community and the structure of British society. As we saw in the case of Anatolian Sunnis and Alevis as well as Turkish Cypriots, traditional, collective and reciprocal solidarity networks which are based on local origin and kinship relation have collapsed because of migration type, settlement pattern and ideological and religious diversities. This functional disappearance in traditional solidarity networks has produced new structural organisations on the basis of ideological and religious frameworks in accordance with ‘gesellschaft’ society. Therefore, migrants who intended to organise their community have transformed their local traditional organisations to ideological organisations and have created the functional equivalent of traditional solidarity networks, so their traditional solidarity networks have intensified in religious and cultural organisations. This new
social organisation has ensured the integration of the London Turkish migrant community into the British social structure and it also has produced social capital and political power for these ideological solidarity networks.

**Conclusion**

Migration type, settlement pattern and ideological diversity in the London Turkish migrant community has given rise to the functional disappearance of traditional solidarity networks and new structural organisations have replaced them in the form of religious and cultural centres. While local origin and the kinship system were the main factors in the organisation of traditional solidarity networks, a religious or ideological framework is the main factor in the organisation of the new solidarity networks based on ‘gesellschaft’ structure. Anatolian Sunnis who came to Britain for the purpose of education and work and later settled down in Britain after getting married to British women, Anatolian Alevis who migrated as asylum seekers, and Turkish Cypriots who came to Britain as a result of post colonial migration, have created a fragmented social structure depending on their migration type, local origin and ideological references.

Traditional local collective and reciprocal solidarity networks have failed to work effectively due to this fragmentation because of migration type, settlement pattern, local origin, and ideological background. Thus, a new structural organisation and integration process have arisen in the form of religious and cultural organisations due to this functional disappearance in order to create solidarity and interaction which were produced by traditional networks when they were in Turkey. Thus, religious and cultural centres in the London Turkish migrant community are the functional equivalent of traditional solidarity networks. As a result, the migration type of migrant has given rise to settlement in the same areas; however, this settlement pattern did not transform the solidarity networks because of ideological diversity which was also a major factor in migration type. At the end of this process a new social organisation produced solidarity networks due to the functional disappearance of the old. This structural and organisational transformation has also produced social capital and political power for these organisations because of structural, organisational and ideological fragmentation.

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